The Uttar Pradesh anti-conversion law, the UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, may appear to violate the fundamental right to religion protected by Article 25 of the Constitution in certain instances, the Supreme Court stated orally on Thursday.
The Vice Chancellor of Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology and Sciences (SHUATS), Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal, and other accused parties were presenting petitions to the bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra over alleged forced religious conversions.
“When you say conversion, what sort of conversion was it here?” questioned the bench.
Senior Lawyer Siddharth Dave retorted on behalf of the defendants, stating that the conversion in question was from Hindu religion to Christianity.
“Was this forced? This was an actual conversion?”, asked the bench.
In response, Mr. Dave said that there have been formal complaints filed about the conversions, claiming that they were forced.
Additionally, he argued that a co-accused, not the victim, was behind the FIRs. Mr. Dave cited Section 4 of the UP Anti-Conversion law, which states that the only individuals who may file a formal complaint (FIR) for an infraction under the Act are the aggrieved party, their mother/father, their sibling, and any other person related to them by blood, marriage, or adoption.
“What if some third person is aware of such-and-such happening? They can make an FIR?”, inquired the bench.
Mr. Dave retorted that the Act’s provisions do not contemplate the same thing and that an inquiry is not possible under such circumstances.
The bench remarked after reviewing the Act’s foundation, “Conversion by itself is not an offence but when it is brought about by undue influence, misrepresentation, coercion, etc. So in such a circumstance, only the victim can say that he has been illegally converted and no other person”.
“What does it mean when it is said that a ritual took place in a church and that ‘Father’ was performing the conversion? Are there any witness statements with regard to luring and coercion?”, inquired the bench.
“Nothing is told that would indicate that any offence was committed. They don’t even say what church it was, which section it was of”, responded Mr. Dave.
Subsequently, Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta argued on behalf of the other accused that the victims were not present at the scene of the alleged incident according to the FIRs, and that the accusation now stands that the accused forced the victims to escape. She argued that the FIRs essentially list the accused as victims. She went on to say that the FIR was filed at a very late time, that the accusations made are ambiguous, and that it does not specifically mention the accused for whom she is presenting.
What about section 10 of the Act, the bench inquired at this point? It imposes vicarious obligation on you in relation to your organization. Even if you weren’t there, how did your organization fare? You could connect if they were present.
“The institution must be complicit in the commission of the offense. Mr. Dave said, “This is not my institution.”
Senior Advocate Rebecca John, representing several other defendants, requested that the FIRs be quashed on the grounds that the first FIR was lodged 5 months before the others, and that the registration of FIRs so many months after the claimed occurrence implies mala fide. She insisted that there can only be one FIR for a single transaction, that if the first FIR is upheld, all others must be dropped, and that a second FIR may only be kept if it is filed through a counter. She argued that if the first was overturned, then the second would be examined.
“How is conversion different from mass conversions?” the bench inquired.
Ms. John explained how the Act envisions harsher punishments for mass conversions.
“So mass conversion would automatically mean that conversion is taking place?” , the bench asked.
“Yes,” said Ms. John.
“Who can complain of a mass conversion then?” questioned Bench.
“For usual conversion, the offended party must initiate the process. Anyone who is dissatisfied with the situation may initiate a mass conversion. Ms. John stated that the FIR must be for a bulk conversion rather than a single conversion.
“Should ‘conversion’ in section 4 be interpreted to imply mass conversion? “In Section 3?” inquired the bench.
In the end, Senior Advocate Siddharth Aggarwal, representing the other accused, sought to take the bench under the terms of the Act.
“Are the provisions of the Act not under challenge?” Justice Misra questioned.
Mr. Aggarwal responded that they are, albeit not in the current series of petitions, and that the pertinent issues are not being stated.
“In some ways, this anti-conversion law appears to violate Article 25,” said Justice Misra.
Finally, the bench ruled that no further proceedings in the FIRs be conducted until the next date of hearing, classifying the current petitions as part-heard.
According to the rules of the Uttar Pradesh legislation, religious conversion requires prior approval from the District Magistrate.
Case Title : RAJENDRA BIHARI LAL AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.| W.P.(Crl.) No. 123/2023 and connected cases.